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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL Y. MALONEY, l 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a corporation, 
Defendant arnd Respondent. j 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7926 
Since plaintiff has made only a general statement of 
facts and deferred a discussion of the details of the evi-
dence to an appropriate place in his argument, we shall 
adopt the same procedure. We wish it understood, how-
ever, that we are not conceding the correctness of all that 
is stated by plaintiff in his statement of facts. Any differ-
ences will be apparent as we give our version of the evi-
dence. 
POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT NO. I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
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(a) THE UNDISPUTED TESTIMONY AS TO THE CON-
DITION OF THE SIDEWALK EXISTING PRIOR TO THE 
ACCIDENT REVEALS NO ACTIONABLE DEFECT. 
(b) THE EVIDENCE OF THE CONDITION EXISTING 
AFTER THE ACCIDENT DID NOT SHOW THAT AN AC-
TIONABLE DEFECT EXISTED PRIOR TO ACCIDENT. 
POINT NO. II. MERE PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE WILL 
NOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT. THE NEGLIGENCE 
PLEADED AND PROVED MUST HAVE BEEN A PROXI-
MATE CAUSE IN PRODUCING THE INJURY. 
POINT NO. III. THE CITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR IN-
JURIES ARISING FROM A LATENT DEFECT IN THE SIDE-
WALK. 
POINT NO. IV. THE VERDICT, THOUGH AWARDING 
DAMAGES AS SPECIAL DAMAGES, SHOULD BE CON-
STRUED AS A GENERAL VERDICT IN THE SUM OF $1000 
AND IS NO GROUNDS FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
(a) THE UNDISPUTED TESTIMONY AS TO THE CON-
DITION OF THE SIDEWALK EXISTING PRIOR TO THE 
ACCIDENT REVEALS NO ACTIONABLE DEFECT. 
We feel that a proper presentation of the facts on 
this, and the .succeeding subdivision, cannot be done by 
simply stating our conclusions of what the evidence 
shows. To say that the sidewalk was cracked, fissured, 
and weakened does not give a true picture of conditions 
nor does it reflect the actual testimony or evidence in 
the case. We trust, therefore, that the court will bear with 
us while we give in detail the testimony and evidence on 
these crucial and determinative points. 
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From plaintiff's testimony it appears that on No-
vember 21, 1951, at about 7 n1inutes to 9 o'clock A.M., he 
was walking west on the north side of South Temple. As 
he arrived at a point imn1ediately in front of the Brans-
ford Apartments, to use his language: 
""\Yell, I just went through the sidewalk real quickly 
and fell." (R. 17) "A hole broke out of the sidewalk about 
4 inches wide and about 1-! inches long and 14 inches 
deep," and his right foot went into the hole. (R. 18) 
In his direct testimony, he gives no description of 
the condition of sidewalk as it existed prior to the time 
of the accident. The accident happened on Wednesday. 
He visited the scene of the accident on the following Mon-
day. (R. 21) Before detailing what he saw on Monday, 
some 4 or 5 days after the accident, we shall refer to his 
testimony on cross examination insofar as it relates to 
what he saw prior to the accident, and shall also refer 
to the testimony of other witnesses on the same subject. 
He had walked over the same sidewalk over a con-
siderable period of time in walking to, work each morning. 
At these times he had not noticed anything wrong with 
the sidewalk. "I never gave it a thought." There wasn't 
anything there that attracted his attention at all as to 
being defective. On the morning of the accident he did 
not notice anything that indicated the sidewalk was de-
fective. (R. 30) 
Q. And as you walked along there you put your 
foot on this particular part of the sidewalk 
and it went down. Is that right~ 
A. That's right. 
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Q. And prior to that time you had not seen any-
thing that would indicate that was dangerous? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you noticed these cracks~ 
A. Well, I have noticed a lot of cracks. I didn't 
notice those particular ones. I didn't take par-
ticular notice at that time. 
Q. As you walk down the sidewalk there are 
cracks in different places, aren't there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There was nothing that you saw in the condi-
tion of the sidewalk that indicated to you any 
hazard~ 
A. No. (R. 31-32) 
On redirect examination he testified he did not go 
along the sidewalk looking for defects. (R. 36) 
The foregoing constituted all of plaintiff's testimony 
as to condition of sidewalk before the accident. 
Catherine Cartwright, witness for plaintiff and de-
fendant, testified that she was walking on her way to 
work behind plaintiff. She did not see him fall, but did 
see him on the sidewalk, his foot in the hole. She had 
fr~quently walked that way to work. (R. 39-42) 
Q. Had you at any time noticed anything par-
ticularly hazardous about this particular 
place~ 
A. No. 
Q. Did it appear to have any difference in eleva-
tion one slab over another? 
A. Insofar as I have been able to observe since 
then even checking along there, there didn't 
seem to be any difference. (R. 42) "The only 
raise that I have noticed is since it was re-
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paired. It is higher now. There is a bump 
there." (R. 43) 
On cross examination by plaintiff. 
Q. Did you particularly look for difference 1n 
elevation~ 
A. No. 
Q. And your testimony that you haven't noticed 
it is based upon the fact that you haven't 
tried to notice or observe~ 
A. That's right. I never paid any attention. 
On redirect, she testified. 
Q. Did you give it, as you passed along there, the 
same ordinary inspection as you would any-
where else~ 
A. That's right. Just glanced to be sure where 
I walked. 
Q. In other words, you walked along there with 
the same attention to the sidewalk as you 
ordinarily use~ 
A. That's right. 
The defendant produced as witnesses E. Wesley 
Smith, Manager of the Eagle Gate Apartments, which is 
the present name of the Bransford Apartments, George 
A. Turner, gardener for said apartments, and Joseph 
J ongejan, elevator operator for said apartments. 
Mr. 'Smith testified he had been manager of the 
apartments for 2112 years; that as part of his employment 
he has made it a practice each morning to walk around all 
the buildings and make observation and the sidewalk in 
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front of the apartments is included in that inspection. On 
the day of the accident, he arrived at the apartment at 
8 A.M. At that time he was in front of the building and 
passed over the sidewalk. 
Q. Did you see anything there that would present 
a hazard to pedestrians~ 
A. Nothing- nothing. 
Q. And had you seen any there prior to that 
time~ 
·A. No sir, I had not. 
Q. Had there been something there that would 
present a hazard, would you have been likely 
to have seen it~ 
A. I am sure I would. 
Q. That was your purpose in making the exami-
na:tion ~ 
A. That was my purpose in going around 
through the buildings. (R. 61-62) 
Mr. Smith further testified that in addition to mak-
ing inspections, he had occasion to assist in shoveling 
snow from the sidewalk. Also, he would have the gar-
dener hose off the sidewalk and keep it clean. 
Q. Did you at any time notice, Mr. Smith, that 
there were depressions there~ 
A. I never noticed depressions there except the 
cracks. There was quite a number of cracks 
that were apparent in the concrete but no evi-
dence of any projection you could stumble 
over. 
Q. And no evidence of any appreciable depres-
sion? 
A. No sir. (R. 63-64) 
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On cross examination he testified that the cracks had 
been there for years. "They were there when I first took 
over the management." 
Q. Have you noticed any essential change in the 
cracks from the time you first took over the 
management to date of this accident~ (R. 63-
64) 
A. No sir. (R. 64) 
George A. Turner, gardener for the apartments, 
testified that he had occasion to be out on the sidewalk 
in front of the apartn1ent about every day. (R. 65) He 
noticed there was sort of a wide crack one half inch or 
so in the pavement separating one row of cement blocks 
from the other. 
Q. Did you at any time notice any uneven-
ness, any raises over which people might 
stumble~ 
A. No, there wasn't any. There wasn't any un-
evenness that I could see in it. 
Q. So far as you could see, the condition of the 
sidewalk presented no hazard to people on the 
street~ 
A. No, I could not see any. 
He testified that he had cleaned the snow off, swept 
the walk once in awhile and hosed it off once in awhile. 
At those times he discovered nothing that would indicate 
any hazard to pedestrians. (R. 66-67) 
On cross examination he testified he had been with 
the apartment six years. During that time he did not 
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notice any e·ssential change in the sidewalk and he had 
not examined the sidewalks for defects, not being par-
ticularly concerned with that. He could not describe 
where the cracks are as he had not paid too much atten-
tion to it. (R. 67-68) 
Joseph J ongejan, elevator operator for 33 years, 
testified that he had been in front of the building on his 
way to and from work each day. Prior to the time of the 
accident he didn't notice anything wrong at all. If he had, 
"that is the first thing I would have notified Mr. Smith 
as soon as I came in." At the time of the accident, "I 
thought it was pretty well fixed for a long while. Very 
nice." 
Q. Did you see any depression over which people 
might stumble or lose their balance~ 
A. Not recently, no sir. 
Q. Or differences in elevations~ 
A. Not in the time since the church took the build-
ing over. No sir. (8 or 10 years). (R. 69-70) 
When asked the particularity with which he has made 
his observation as to condition of sidewalk, he testified, 
"Well, I always noticed if there was any paper laying on 
the sidewalk and sticks so people won't fall over them 
and I usually pick it up and take it inside and put it in 
the garbage; otherwise, the sidewalk is always nice and 
clean. I didn't never notice anything. There might be a 
few, oh, little cracks that have been there ever so long, 
but I didn't pay any attention to them." 
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On cross examination he testified that he did not 
know that there were cracks in the vicinity of where that 
hole is now. 
Q. You don't know of any particular crack any-
where on the sidewalk 1 
A. No, just a few old cracks is all I know- every 
day cracks -just a few on the outside by the 
steps a little ways. 
He did not know there is a crack immediately adja-
cent to the cement patch. 
Q. In other words, your observation has just been 
a casual observation of someone going in and 
out of the building. 
A. That's all. The sidewalk was in the same con-
dition on November 21, 1951 as it had been 
for 6 or 8 years prior thereto. (R. 71-2) 
The foregoing constitutes all of the evidence as to 
the condition of the sidewalk prior to the date of the acci-
dent by witnesses who had seen the sidewalk prior to the 
accident. We submit that such evidence wholly fails to 
establish any actionable defect. On the contrary, it af-
firmatively establishes there was no such defect, but only 
some "every day cracks." 
(b) THE EVIDENCE OF THE CONDITION EXISTING 
AFTER THE ACCIDENT DID NOT SHOW THAT AN AC-
TIONABLE DEFECT EXISTED PRIOR TO ACCIDENT. 
The plaintiff testified that on Monday following 
Wednesday, the date of the accident, he returned to the 
scene. (R. 21) Exhibits A, B & C, photos taken of the 
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scene, were identified by plaintiff as accurately reflect-
ing the condition of the scene of the accident as it ap-
peared to him on Monday. These exhibits were admitted 
in evidence over defendant's objection that no proper 
foundation had been laid for their reception, there being 
no evidence to show the pictures reflected the condition 
of the hole immediately after the accident. (R. 22-23) 
Using Exhibit A, and directing plaintiff's attention 
to the line diagonally across the picture and against which 
the ruler is leaning, he testified: That there was a dif-
ference in elevation between the cement to the north 
(right) of this line and the cement to the south of this line 
at the point where the ruler is, of about 1f2 inch, the north 
being higher than the south. This is at the west end of 
the hole. At the opposite, east, end of the hole, at the 
round black object revealed in Exhibit A, he observed 
the difference in elevation of an inch, the north cement 
being higher than the south. (R. 24-25) 
This is the same line or crack referred to by Mr. 
Tu.rner. (R. 66) It marks the separation between the 
City's walk on the south and the property walk on the 
north. There actually is no crack at all. As shown by 
defendant's Exhibit 3,' it separates the north and ~outh 
concrete. 
Plaintiff also testified that the slab of cement en-
closed by the crack running along the left edge of Exhibit 
A and then to the north, tipped down toward the hole. 
Also the piece at the east end of the hole tipped slightly 
down. (R. 25) There is absolutely no testimony, how-
ever, as to the degree of dipping or tipping. 
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Referring to Exhibit B and to the line marked XX, 
which runs fron1 the top of the picture down to the east 
and west line already referred to, he testified he did not 
notice much difference in elevation between the sides of 
that crack. (R. 26) On cross examination he testified 
that he couldn't see any difference in elevation and if it 
had been noticeable he would have seen it. (R. 34) 
He testified he did not obtain the yardstick shown 
in Exhibits A, B & C; he doesn't know whose it is; and 
it was not there on Monday. He had no ruler to measure 
with. His estimate here is simply based upon a casual 
observation. (R. 32-33) 
Explaining further the difference in elevation be-
tween the north and south slabs at the west end of the 
hole by the ruler, he testified there was no difference in 
elevation 6 or 8 inches west of the hole, but from that 
point east to the hole it sloped somewhat toward the hole. 
Any slope of the rest of the pavement was not noticeable. 
(R. 28) 
The difference in elevation of 1 inch between the 
north and south slabs at the east of the hole went east 
about 6 or 8 inches. As to this difference in elevation it is 
perfectly apparent from all the photos that there was a 
small triangular chip in the surface of the south cement 
strip extending easterly about 6 or 8 inches. The topping 
had chipped off leaving the aggregate underneath ex-
posed. The small stones of this aggregate are visible in 
Exhibit A and also in defendant's Exhibit 2. Naturally 
this loss of topping would cause the top of the cement 
where that occurred to be somewhat lower than the sur-
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face of the adjoining cement. But there is no testimony 
that this topping was missing before the accident. The 
presence of this chip would account for at least a sub-
stantial part, if not all, of the difference in elevation of 1 
inch testified to by plaintiff. For aught that appears this 
chip came out when the sidewalk collapsed under plain-
tiff's weight, and the testimony of all the witnesses who 
testified as to the condition of the walk prior to the acci-
dent, including plaintiff, sustains that conclusion. 
Joseph Novak, a graduate engineer, examined the 
scene of the accident the day before the trial, which would 
be September 29, 1952, about 10 months after the event 
and also after the hole had been repaired. ( R. 46) He 
testified that there was a difference in the appearance of 
an old crack in cement and a new one, the former being 
discolored and the faces of concrete being smoother due 
to erosion. He made measurements along the crack shown 
in Exhibit C, marked at the right edge of the photo by an 
X. This is the crack that runs north and south from the 
north edge of the City's walk through the entrance walk 
leading to the apartment entrance. At a point 3 inches 
north of the City walk, the west portion of the entrance 
walk was lf2 inch lower than the portion east of the crack. 
Eleven inches north of the City walk the west side of the 
crack was % inches lower than the east side. Thirty 
inches north of the City walk the west side of the crack 
was% inch lower than the east. (R. 46-48) 
The court permitted him to testify over objection, 
that when the hole was repaired, the surface of the patch 
sloped up toward the east to meet the elevation of the ori-
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ginal cement. The joinder being at the crack marked X, 
Exhibit C. The original cement at that point was 1,4 inch 
higher than the surface of the patch at a point 3, inches 
to the west. (R. 49) 
The cracks appearing on Exhibit C to the left of the 
ruler were not visible to him, the patch having covered 
them. The crack that extends to the west is visible a short 
distance. (R. 50) "The concrete where the sidewalk is in 
the immediate area of the patch, not being the patch, its 
adjacent area, the general slope of the concrete was in 
the direction of the patch." (R. 51) The difference in the 
elevation of the cement bordering the crack running north 
towards the building, marked X, was due to the west side 
subsiding, it had sunk. (R. 52) 
The crack, still visible and outside the patch, is the 
crack that extends west from the letter "0" on Exhibit 
C. The crack extending east to the other "0" is covered 
by the patch. The crack that is visible is at least 4 years 
old. He saw a very faint crack in the cement west of the 
hole, indicated by the letter "A" on Exhibit B, being about 
6 inches west of the patch. The sidewalk sloped from the 
crack towards the patch. (R. 55) He observed no dif-
ference in elevation between the north slab and the south 
slab between Point A and the patch. (R. 57) 
It will be noticed that nowhere does the witness at-
tempt to give the rate or degree of slope or any testimony 
to indicate even any substantial slope. He admitted he 
had no opinion as to how long the difference in elevation 
had existed along the crack running north from the City 
sidewalk to the building. 
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The foregoing testimony of plaintiff and ~Ir. Novak, 
together with the photos to which they referred, consti-
tutes all of the evidence submitted by plaintiff in his at-
tempt to show the existence of an actionable defect in the 
walk at the time of the accident. Plaintiff's testimony 
concerns what he saw by a casual glance five days after 
the accident. He says the north strip of cement, the strip 
leading into the apartment entrance, as shown by defend-
ant's Exhibit 1, was about 1j2 inch higher at the northwest 
corner of the hole than the south, or City sidewalk, the 
difference in elevation sloping up from that point west 
6 inches to become even on both sides of the line. Over 
on the east edge of the hole, where the topping is chipped 
off, he said the north side was an inch above the south 
side. No evidence is given that the triangular chip in the 
topping was missing before the accident, so there is abso-
lutely no evidence that the difference in elevation between 
the north and south sides of the line existed at the time 
the accident happened. As to the crack running north 
through the apartment entrance approach, he saw no dif-
ference in elevation between the east and west side of the 
crack. 
Mr. Novak, about ten months later, measured the 
differences in elevation between the east and west sides 
of this north and south crack and found difference in ele-
vation of 1;2 and % inches. But this crack, concededly is 
not on the city sidewalk. Furthermore, Novak admits he 
has no opinion as to how long that elevation had existed; 
that the difference in elevation would tend to increa~e 
with passage of time. As to the condition in the vi('inity 
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of the hole, he merely testifies as to certain small cracks 
as being -l: or 5 years old; that the sidewalk slopes up to 
meet the patch put in by the City at some places. The 
only description of the degree of the slope was at one 
place the slope was slight, at another place, the east side 
of the patch sloped up 14 inch to meet the pavement. 
Such a slope is no indication as to what the condition was 
before the accident. It only indicates the persons putting 
in the patch put it in in that fashion. Nowhere does he 
give an opinion that these slopes indicated any kind of 
depression in the original sidewalk, or any condition of 
hazard to pedestrians, or any indication that the sidewalk 
was weakened or that such sloping gave any warning that 
a condition existed that would put the City on notice that 
a hazard existed. 
We submit that plaintiff's evidence wholly failed to 
prove the existence of an actionable defect in the walk at 
the time of the accident. But any inferences that the con-
ditions testified to by plaintiff existed on the day of the 
accident are completely dispelled by defendant's evidence. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's evidence as to conditions after 
the accident was not competent to prove conditions on 
the date of the accident, without a showing that no change 
in the conditions had occurred in the meantime. No such 
showing was made. 
In Winkler vs. City of Columbus, Ohio App. - 71 
N.E. 2d 729, the plaintiff sought to testify as to her ob-
servations of the sidewalk the day following the accident. 
The court held this testimony was not competent "for the 
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reason that it did not appear that there had not been any 
change in the condition of the walk." 
First of all, there is undisputed evidence that the 
condition at the hole did change between the time of the 
accident and the following Monday, when plaintiff was 
there making observations. This is made clearly manifest 
by comparing plaintiff's photo Exhibit A and defendant's 
photo Exhibit 2. It was stipulated that Exhibit 2, as well 
as 1 and 3, were taken by the police photographer at the 
time the ambulance came for plaintiff immediately after 
the accident. (R. 75) Exhibit A was· taken looking north-
west, Exhibit 2 was taken looking north, north being in-
dicated by a small blue "N" at the'top margin. Exhibit 2 
shows that a large part of the concrete along the nortli 
edge of the break was still in place and the broken off part 
appears in the hole close to the surface. In Exhibit A, 
nearly all of this cement along the north of the hole is 
gone, leaving only a little sliver, running to the black spot 
referred to in plaintiff's testimony at the east edge of the 
hole. Somehow that cement was knocked off and the hole 
beneath is revealed in Exhibit A, but not in Exhibit 2. 
The broken piece is not in the same position in the hole in 
Exhibit A compared with Exhibit 2. Likewise, the piece 
of cement intact along the south and west sides of the hole 
is less in Exhibit A than in Exhibit 2, showing a further 
breaking off and displacement occurred between the day 
of the accident and the following Monday. These same 
differences in the conditions can be seen by comparing 
Exhibit 2 with Exhibits Band C. It is evident that some-
one broke off the ledges of the cement and 1noved the 
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broken piece in the hole. This breaking would undoubt-
edly disturb the remaining cement at the edges, if any ap-
preciable pressure was applied to break off these pieces, 
as the cavity extends to the east and to the west of the 
hole. This disturbance could easily account for the dif-
ference in elevation testified to by plaintiff. 
That such is the real explanation of the differences 
in elevation at the time plaintiff made his observation 
on l\Ionday is established without dispute by the testi-
mony of defendant's witnesses, W. L. Gardner and W. Y. 
Tipton. 
Mr. Gardner, claim agent for the City, testified that he 
went up to the scene first about 10 A.M. and again at 11 
A.M. the day of the accident. (R. 87) He examined the 
slabs adjoining the hole and found them level. Exhibit 
3 is a photo looking east up the sidewalk. It shows a 
heavy line separating the north concrete from the city 
sidewalk. This is the same line against which the ruler 
is leaning in plaintiff's Exhibit C. In the vicinity of the 
hole, there was no difference in elevation between the con-
crete north and south of the line. There was no sloping 
at the point "A" on plaintiff's Exhibit B. (Mr. Novak 
testified there was a slight slope toward the patch at that 
part.) (R. 86) The piece of cement on the east side of the 
hole, shown on Exhibit "B" which is separated by a crack' 
mark, was also level. As to the crack running toward the 
building marked X, on Exhibit C, there was a difference 
in elevation between the concrete on each side of not more 
than 14 inch. Along the main sidewalk he saw nothing 
over which people might stumble. (R. 87) The cement in 
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the area of the hole did not tip toward the hole. Most of 
the cavity was north of the hole. (R. 88) The cavity was 
2 or 3 feet wide east and west, and 21j2 feet north of the 
hole, measured north and south, and about 6 inches south 
of the hole. (R. 90) None of the· sidewalk dipped toward 
the hole. (R. 91) It was stipulated that the north side of 
the hole is the north side of the City walk. 
Mr. Tipton, a licensed civil engineer and surveyor 
and chief draftsman in the City Engineer's office, testi-
fied on the date of the accident he visited the scene shortly 
before noon. He made measurements and prepared a 
sketch in evidence as Exhibit 4. The City sidewalk is 8 
feet wide. The cement to the north is 4 feet 3 inches 
wide. (R. 93) He measured the height of the one slab 
above the other along the crack marked "y", Exhibit 4, 
being the crack XX on Exhibit B that Novak testified 
he measured. At the point of greatest departure the dif-
ference in elevation was four-tenths inch, the east slab 
being higher than the west side. The difference is not 
quite as much against the north side of the City walk and 
the upper third next to the steps the slabs were practi-
cally flush, not more than one-tenth in variation. (R. 96) 
He outlin~d on Exhibit 4, the perimeter of the cavity 
as he determined it. The north and south diameter of the 
cavity is about 4 feet, 3 feet being north of the center of 
the hole in the cement walk and 1 foot being south there-
of. The cavity extends 2 feet east of the center of the 
hole in the walk and about 3 feet to the west thereof. (R. 
97-98) 
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He observed the condition of the sidewalk immedi-
ately around the hole and found it flat, no protuberances 
or raises, the pieces of concrete separated by cracks, as 
shown in Exhibit 2, were flush with each other. They 
were practically flush, the whole area around the hole. 
There wasn •t any difference in elevation between the con-
crete on the north, and the concrete on the south consti-
tuting the main sidewalk in the immediate vicinity of the 
hole. "There might have been an Vs of an inch, or sOlne-
thing like that, but I mean for all practical purposes, it is 
practically flat." He saw no hazard except the hole itself. 
E. L. K~insman, repaired the hole April 8, 1952. He 
had to enlarge the opening in the sidewalk to fill the 
cavity. He saw no difference in elevation between the 
City sidewalk and the cement entrance to the apartment 
on the north. (R. 7 4) He saw no difference in elevation 
between these cement rows at the line which separated 
them. (R. 76) The cement around the hole was not pro-
truding anywhere. It was perfectly flat with nothing to 
make a hazard if the hole was not there. (R. 77) Before 
he repaired the hole there was a difference in elevation 
in the triangle at the east end of the hole of approxi-
mately 1f2 inch. This is the dark spot on Exhibit A, at the 
northeast corner of the hole. (R. 79) On cross examina-
tion, Kinsman testified that the little triangular dark 
place on the east side of the hole on Exhibit A is where 
the topping had come. off, and it gave down a little bit, 
and at that place the City walk was from 1;4 to lh inch 
lower than the cement to the north. (R. 78-79) He also 
testified that the City sidewalk and cement to the north 
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were separated by a felt strip. So the line shown on Ex-
hibit A and the other photos running between the two 
strips of cement is not a crack at all. It is merely a felt 
strip se·parating the two rows of cement. This is ex-
plained by the fact that the City sidewalk was put in be-
fore the walk to the north. (R. 95) 
Lynn Glines, repair foreman, testified he was at the 
scene the day repairs were made. As to the difference 
in elevation between the City sidewalk and the walk to the 
north, he first testified there was a slight difference, and 
then on cross examination admitted he had no clear mem-
ory about it and paid no attention to it. 
We think the foregoing analysis of the evidence 
completely meets and refutes the conclusions and general 
statements of counsel as to the facts, without repeating 
counsel's assertions and then give the answering facts 
from the record. Counsel asserts that the photos show a 
difference in elevation between the City walk and the ce-
ment to the north. Take Exhibit B. It is admitted by 
Novak that at point A there was no difference in eleva-
tion. It was admitted by plaintiff that on the east side 
of the hole, 6 or 8 inches beyond the· hole, there was no 
difference in elevation. Looking at the line west and east 
of Point A and west and east of the crack at point X, east 
of the hole, we submit there is absolutely nothing revealed 
there that shows any difference in elevation between the 
two cement strips east or west. Exhibits 1 and 3 show 
perfect evenness. 
The authorities generally support the rule stated in 7 
McQuillan, MUIYI!icipal Corporation, p. 125, sec. 2956: 
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"To be actionable, the obstruction must be 
dangerous, and the danger must be such as a rea-
sonably prudent person ·would have anticipated as 
a natural result." 
In Pollari rs. Salt Lake City, 111 Ut. 25, 176 P. 2d 
111, the court approved an instruction that the city would 
be liable if the defect ""was of such a character as to con-
stitute a hazard to pedestrians using the sidewalk while 
exercising due care for their own safety." 
In that case no question was raised as to whether 
a defect was of a character to be actionable or not. But 
in addition to there being a hole 5 x 3 inches and 11,6 
inches deep, there was an abrupt raise of 2 to 21j2 inches 
in the slab next to the sidewalk and it was because of 
this combination the accident happened. 
Davidson v. City of New York, 117 NYS 185: 
"It is impossible to free a city from such slight 
defects and unreasonable to say or permit a jury 
to say, that they are 'obvious dangers' which is the 
test of the city's liability. We know that they are 
not. If they were, thousands and thousands would 
be hurt by them hourly. That it is 'possible' for 
someone out of many, out of millions, as it may be, 
to trip on such a defect does not make it danger-
ous. Probability, not possibility governs." 
Forrester v. City of Nashville, 179 Tenn. 682, 169 
S.W. 2d 860: The court quotes from McQuillin above 
and states: 
"Probability, not possibility governs; that it 
is 'possible' for someone out of many to trip on so 
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slight a projection in a sidewalk as 1s here In-
volved does not make it dangerous." 
City of Da;yton v. Fox, 254 Ky. 51,70 S.W. 2d, 961: 
"It is well settled that the liability of the city 
is not that of a guarantor or insurer of the safety 
of the pedestrian. The city is only bound to use 
reasonable care in making the streets and side-
walks safe and convenient for travel. It is under 
no obligation to provide against everything that 
may happen upon them, but only for such things 
as ordinarily exist or such as may be reasonably 
expected to occur to the users thereof when in the 
exercise of ordinary care for their own safety. 
Mere unevenness of the surface of the sidewalk is 
not such obvious dangerous or unsafe condition as 
to impress the mind of a reasonably prudent per-
son as unsafe. Dangerous or unsafe conditions 
will not be presumed from the accident alone and 
the mere fact that a pedestrian slipped and fell 
upon the sidewalk is insufficient to warrant a 
recovery, unless it is shown that the condition of 
the walk at the place was necessarily dangerous or 
unsafe for pedestrians where in the exercise of 
ordinary care for their own safety, and the unsafe 
condition was the proximate cause of the injury.'' 
Under the rule above stated, it is clear that there 
was no proof of an actionable defect existing at the time 
the accident happened or even at the time the plaintiff 
visited the hole five days later, not considering, of course, 
the hole itself. 
POINT NO. II. MERE PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE WILL 
NOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT. THE NEGLIGENCE 
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PLEADED AND PROVED MUST HAVE BEEN A PROXI-
MATE CAUSE IN PRODUCING THE INJURY. 
It is clear from plaintiff's own testimony that his 
fall \Vas not in any \vise caused by the differences in ele-
vation between the City sidewalk and the property walk 
to the north, even assuming the evidence tended to show 
some difference in elevation existed at the time of the 
accident. Likewise, it is also clear that the difference 
in elevation between the east and west sides of the crack 
running north through the prope·rty entrance walk did not 
cause him to fall. He did not stumble, or turn his ankle, 
or slip, or in any other manner experience anything un-
toward because of either of these differences in elevation. 
His fall was occasioned by the collapsing of the piece of 
sidewalk which gave way under his weight because of the 
lack of support underneath due to the cavity. 
Counsel assumes that because plaintiff testified there, 
was a difference of 1f2 inch in elevation of the north 
cement over the City walk at the west end of the hole 
and one inch difference in elevation at the east end of the 
hole, this is proof there was a difference in elevation be-
tween the two slabs of cement running the entire length of 
the hole. There is absolutely no evidence on which to base 
such an assumption, nor is there any evidence as to what 
difference in elevation, if any, there may have been, as-
suming there was a difference. For aught that appears 
in plaintiff's evidence the difference in elevation was con-
fined to the two places to the west and east ends of the 
hole. The two slabs of cement may have been absolutely 
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level all of the rest of the way along the north edge of the 
hole. 
It is without dispute that the claimed difference in 
elevation to the east and west of the hole did not cause 
or permit any collapse at those places for no collapse 
actually occurred there, even though these two places 
were actually over the cavity. The photographs show 
these places to be perfectly intact. 
Furthermore, the line between the two slabs of ce-
ment was not a crack, in the sense contended for by coun-
sel. It was simply the separation, or expansion, joint 
between the two rows of cement put in at different times. 
Whether one was higher than the other when put in does 
not appear. Nor does such difference in elevation indi-
cate a weakness or any element which would contribute 
to the collapse. There is no evidence there was a differ-
ence in elevation along the south side of the hole, and yet, 
the sidewalk gave way there as well as along the north 
side. 
The all important fact in this case is that the side-
walk was not supported underneath. Had there been sus-
taining earth, the presence of the crack, such as counsel 
has created out of assumptions and speculations, would 
have caused no collapse and no accident. Yet he disclaims 
any attempt to impute notice of the presence of the cavity 
from notice of the presence of the crack. He asserts the 
crack weakened the sidewalk thus permitting it to col-
lapse, so the crack became a contributing cause of the 
collapse and the attending accident, even though the 
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crack referred to was there from the time the sidewalk 
to the north was laid. 
First he talks about a difference in elevation as being 
the defect of which the City had notice claiming such de-
fect constituted a hazard. Then he abandons the element 
of elevation and says there was a crack and the crack was 
what caused the weakening. But the crack was not caused 
by the one side subsiding as in the case of the crack run-
ning north to the apartment entrance. There had always 
been a crack there as the city walk was put in first and a 
felt strip separated it from the cement later laid by the 
property owners. The subsiding of the city's walk, if ·any, 
did not create a crack so as to weaken the carrying power 
of the sidewalk to span the cavity underneath as the 
separation was already there before any subsidence. 
There had always been two separate strips of cement, the 
city sidewalk and the apartment entrance walk. The pres-
ence of a difference in elevation to the west and east of 
the hole does not indicate that the sidewalk there was 
weakened in a longitudinal direction so that it would not 
hold up as a span over a cavity existing underneath. This 
same crack, the separation of the city sidewalk from the 
owner's walk, runs the entire length of the two strips of 
cement as shown on Exhibit 3. The presence of this so 
called crack, elsewhere than at the hole, presents no 
reason for assuming that the sidewalk is actually weak-
ened all along this course. The same conclusion must like-
wise follow as to that part of this same crack as it passes 
the hole. 
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So it appears from the very nature of the construc-
tion that the crack referred to by counsel had always ex-
isted. Of the existence of that crack the city concededly 
had notice, but that does not prove that the difference in 
·elevation testified to by plaintiff had existed before the 
accident or that the city had notice thereof. And that dif-
ference in elevation is the defect of which counsel says 
the city had notice. The evidence is undisputed there was 
no difference· in elevation before the accident or at a time 
shortly after and on the day of the accident as we have 
already demonstrated from the testimony by plaintiff 
and Mr. Cartwright, Mr. Smith, Mr. T-qrner, Mr. Jonge-
jan, Mr. Gardner and Mr. Tipton. The city was not called 
upon to prove that the difference in elevation testified 
to by pla,intiff was a recent condition arising only after 
the accident. On the contrary, the burden was on plain-
tiff to show that the difference in eleva.tion had existed 
a sufficient length of time before the accident so that 
notice of its presence could be imputed to the city. 
Counsel further injects into his description of the 
sidewalk, as a part of a visible defect of which he said 
the city had notice, the phrase "general fissured and 
cracked condition" of the sidewalk. By this he must refer 
to the cracks and fissures shown on Exhibit C, as being 
to the east and south of the hole. But those cracks and 
fissures cannot have had any causal connection with the 
collapse. They were still there after the accident, un-
affected by the collapse, and having no connection with 
the hole in the sidewalk. These cracks and fissures con-
stitute no hazard. The surface of the cement around them 
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and adjacent to them was perfectly even. The crack run-
ning north in the apartment entrance walk had no con-
nection with the hole and remained there apart from the 
hole after the accident. It had no connection whatever 
with the hole. The repeated use of such general descrip-
tiYe words and the total absence of any connection be-
tween the condition so described and the accident empha-
sizes the necessity we expressed in the beginning of mak-
ing a thorough and detailed statement of the evidence. 
The sidewalk laid by the City was not designed to 
span cavities underneath. It was designed and intended 
to rest upon supporting earth. As so designed and in-
tended the mere presence of cracks therein would not 
affect its use with perfect safety. Suppose someone un-
known to the city had excavated underneath the cement 
walk an hour. before the plaintiff came along. The acci-
dent could have resulted the same as it did. Could any 
one say that the cracked and fissured condition would 
then have made the city liable for the accident~ There is 
absolutely no distinction between such a situation and 
the one here involved except in the former we might know 
who made the excavation and when. All that the cracked 
and fissured condition, visible on any of the photos, could 
possibly do would be to furnish a condition upon which 
the real cause, the cavity, could operate, if it did. That 
the cracked and fissured condition referred to by counsel 
did not have even that aspect is demonstrated by the 
photographs themselves as there was no cave in at that 
location. But it must be constantly kept in mind that 
there is no evidence whatever that there was a fissured 
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and cracked condition in or immediately around the slab 
of sidewalk that did cave in, the only location on the side-
walk that could have any connection whatever with the 
cavity. The only crack shown to be in existence at the 
hole was the separation between the city walk and the 
walk to the north. How can it be said, then, that the 
cracked and fissured condition of the sidewalk was a 
contributing cause to the collapse of sidewalk~ 
Counsel states that: "The negligence of the city is 
in permitting this crack (separation between the city walk 
and the apartment entrance block) to go unrepaired for 
four years. The unrepaired crack was one of the main 
and direct causes of the sidewalk failure." What was un-
repaired about this crack~ Certainly the city had the 
right to install its 8 foot walk and the owner of the prop-
erty install an abutting walk with a separation or expan-
sion joint between. It would have been physically impos-
sible not to have left some crack between the two walks. 
This same crack continues east and west of the cavity all 
along the two rows of concrete walk. (Exhibit 3) Counsel 
certainly does not mean that the city, to properly main-
tain its sidewalk, should have eliminated this crack so 
there would have been complete adhesion between the 
city walk and the apartment walk. He can only mean that 
the city should have repaired by eliminating the claimed 
difference in elevation between these rows of cement at 
the places testified to by plaintiff. F·ailure to do that 
is actually the only negligence that can be claimed or 
charged. But that negligence did not eontribute to the 
collapsing since the same separation between the two 
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walks would be there regardless of whether there was a 
difference in elevation between the walks. The difference 
in elevation could have been repaired so as to eliminate 
it as a traffic hazard, but not, of course, to give the walk 
more carrying strength, either by chipping back a little 
on the north walk or by putting in a little black top along 
the city walk as Mr. Gardner testified had frequently been 
done. (R. 92) But the danger of collapse would have re-
mained unabated. 
We shall not attempt any protracted discussion of 
the question of proximate cause. Under the authorities 
cited by plaintiff the injury complained of must be a 
"direct", to use the language of the English case cited, or 
an "actual", to use the language of Stone v. Railroad, re-
sult of the negligence relied on. 
In Harrstrich v. O.S.L.R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 P. 
100, where the negligence relied on was the failure to ring 
the bell or give proper warning before the train started 
across the highway, the court said: 
"The controlling question, however, is, was 
the negligence of defendant the proximate cause 
of the injury sustained by plaintiff~ It is a funda-
mental principle of law that no matter how gross 
the negligence complained of may be, it crea;tes no 
liability unless it is the proximate cause of the in-
jury." 
In Kawaguchi v. Bennett, ______ Utah 189, P. 2d 109, 
this court quotes approvingly an instruction defining 
proximate cause as that cause which in natural continu-
ous sequence, unbroken by any active intervening cause, 
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produces the injury, and without which the result would 
not have occurred. 
In Sumsion v. Streator Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 
P. 2d 680, the court says: 
"It is a fundamental principle of the law of 
negligence that the person complaining has the 
burden of showing a causal connection between 
the negligent conduct complained of and the injury 
to plaintiff .... 
"While deductions may be based on probabili-· 
ties, the evidence must do more than merely raise 
a conjecture or show a probability. Where there 
are probabilities the other way equally or more 
potent the deductions are mere guesses and the 
jury should not be permitted to speculate. The 
rule is well established in this jurisdiction that 
where the proximate cause of injury is left to con-
jecture, plaintiff must fail as a matter of law." 
In Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 P. 2d 1366, 104 
A.L.R. 943, in his dissenting opinion Judge Wolfe dis-
cusses the question of causal connection between the 
negligence relied on and the injury sustained. We refer 
particularly to his discussion of the 8th class, covering 
the omission class, where he stated in part: 
"By the very nature of this type of alleged 
negligence it is often times difficult to say whether 
the accident would probably not have happened 
but for the omission, or, put in another wa)', that 
the omission contributed to the accident. It will 
be found in those cases where it is said such al-
leged cause is too remote, the true reason is that 
there is not sufficient probability that a supplying 
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of the mnlSSlon would have avoided the acCI-
dent." 
2 Restatement Law of Torts, Sec. 431, the rule is 
stated thus : 
" (a) In order to be a legal cause of another's 
harm, it is not enough that the harm would not 
have occurred had the actor not been negligent. 
Except as stated in Sec. 432 (2), this is necessary 
but it is not of itself sufficient. The negligence 
must also be a substantial factor as well as an ac-
tual factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. 
The word 'substantial' is used to denote the fact 
that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in 
producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to 
regard it as a cause, using the word in the popular 
sense in which there always lurks the idea of re-
sponsibility, rather than in the so-called 'philo-
sophic sense,' which includes every one of the 
great number of events without which any hap-
pening would not have occurred. Each of these 
events is a cause in the so-called 'philosophic 
sense,' yet the effect of many of them is so in-
significant that no ordinary mind would think of 
them as causes." 
"(b) It is only where the evidence permits 
a reasonable finding that the defendant's conduct 
had 1some effect that the question whether the 
effect was substantial rather than negligible be-
comes imporant." 
This is the same rule advocated by Professor Smith 
~ 1n the Harvard Law Review referred to in plaintiff's 
tl brief. A very interesting and instructive discussion of 
the various rules for determining proximate cause is con-
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tained in the majority and minority opinions in Mahoney 
v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 A. 762, 66 A.L.R. 1121, 
where the views of the various authorities in texts and 
articles are discussed. The dissenting opinion continued 
to uphold the rule that a "wrong doer, though not guilty 
of intentional wrong should be held for all the harmful 
results caused by his wrong doing. I think the limitation 
of liability for wrong doing to those results which follow 
in a natural sequence accords with an innate sense of 
justice in the ordinary man." Foreseeability of the re-
sulting harm as the text is rejected by both opinions. And, 
yet, after the accident, in determining whether the results 
can be traced in natural sequence back to the negligence 
charged, the foreseeability of resulting harm would iri 
all probability be demonstrated. 
New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v. Burge, 191 Miss. 303, 
2 So. 2d 825, follows the rule in Reinstatement of Torts 
above quoted and says : 
".An actor's negligent conduct is not a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about harm to another 
if it would have sustained even if the actor had not 
been guilty of the particular negligence charged. H 
In Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 256 N.W. 901, 
the court refers to 16 Minn. Law Review 829, and states: 
"The rule there advocated is that one's negli-
gence should be a material element in causing an-
other's injury before it can be said to be the proxi-
mate cause thereof. It is very interesting to note 
that .A.L. Institute Restatement of Torts has 
' 
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abandoned altogether the words 'proximate cause' 
thereof and substituted therefor the words 'sub-
stantial factor'." 
Without citing further authorities on the question of 
proximate cause, we assert that no matter what test is ape. 
plied to this case there is no causal connection between 
the accident and the claimed difference in elevation of the 
city walk and the adjoining walk. Under the conditions 
shown by the evidence the accident would have happened 
if there had been no difference in elevation. The presence 
of the so-called crack could have no effect in weakening 
the sidewalk as there had never been any adhesion 
between the two walks. 
We cite the following cases to illustrate the necessity 
for causal connection between the aefects complained 
of and the resulting injury. 
Davis v. Potter, 340 Pa. 485, 17 A. 2d 338. Here a 
part of the sidewalk was raised from % inch to 1 and Ys 
inch above the rest of the walk by paving what had for-
merly been a grating over a light well. Plaintiff said her 
foot went over the incline, it went off like a slant. "What 
was complained of is the slight elevation of part of the 
sidewalk, but she did not stumble or trip over it; and 
whether it was actually the cause of her fall is far from 
clear. Negligence is not a ground for recovery unless the 
causative factor of the accident." 
The case is followed in Harrison v. City of Pitts-
burg, 253 Pa. 22, 44 A. 2d 273, where plaintiff slipped on 
the metal rim of the man hole in the sidewalk covered 
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with snow. The court points out that the depression 
around the manhole had nothing to do with her fall. 
Thurbron v. Dravo Contracting Co., 238 Pa. 443, 86 
A. 292, 44 L.R.A. NS 699. A team of horses ran away 
and because no barriers were erected across the street, 
the bridge being then in the process of being removed, the 
team plunged into the river. The court says: 
"The defendant's negligence in failing to erect 
barriers on the embankments may be conceded, but 
liability for plaintiff's loss does not result there-
from, except as such negligence was the proximate 
cause. The mere concurrence of one's negligence 
with the proximate and efficient cause of the dis-
aster will not create liability. But for the escape 
of horses from the control of the party in charge 
the accident would not have happened. For that 
escape defendants, of course, were not liable." 
POINT NO. III. THE CITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR IN-
JURIES ARISING FROM A LATENT DEFECT IN THE SIDE-
WALK .• 
While the plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect of the 
proposition above stated by saying he is relying on the 
"fissured, cracked, weakened condition of the sidewalk 
at the point where collapse occurred," we submit that the 
cavity is the sole proximate cause of the accident and that, 
since the city had no notice of its presence, it is not liable 
in this case as a matter of law. We refer the court to the 
following cases: 
Mathews v. City of Richmond, 291 Ky. 387, 164 S."\V. 
2d 968. Here the concrete walk broke under plaintiff 
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and he dropped into a hole 18 inches deep, the base of the 
walk had disintegrated, leaving only a thin top layer. 
There was a crack in the concrete 12 feet long, but no 
hole was visible. Photographs were introduced in evi-
dence. The court held the crack was not sufficient to 
put the city on notice, saying: 
"The defect was latent. The crack in the con-
crete as described in the evidence and shown by 
the photograph, was insufficient to put the city 
on notice .... 
"There \Yas no proof that the city had actual 
notice of the defective condition of the sidewalk, 
and the proof relied upon to show that the condi-
tion existed for such length of time as to impute 
knowledge thereof to the municipal authoritie8 
was insufficient to warrant a submission of that 
question to the jury." 
German v. City of McKeesport, 137 Pa. Super 41, 8 
A. 2d 437. Here there was a hole 16 inches long and 2'"' 
inches wide that was filled with dirt. It appeared to be 
of the same material as the sidewalk and no hole appeared 
to the casual observer. Plaintiff's heel sank into the hole 
and she was thrown. The court says: 
"She (Plaintiff) relied upon constructive 
notice of the alleged defect, for none other was al-
leged or proved. Before a municipality may be 
charged with constructive notice. of the existence 
of a defect (in a sidewalk), it must appear that the 
dangerous condition is apparent upon reasonable 
inspection. In Emery v. Pittsburg, 275, Pa. 551, P. 
553, 119 A. 603, p. 604, it is said: 
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'A municipality can be charged with con-
structive notice of a defect in a sidewalk only 
when it is of such a character as to be gen-
erally observable by pedestrians; that is, such 
as could and naturally would be seen by 
people using the walk.' 
"This means that the dangerous condition 
must be such as to be observed and apprehended 
by the ordinary pedestrian. If it is of a nature 
to require very close examination before its dan-
gerous character appears, the municipality is not 
chargeable with constructive notice of it." 
Baustian v. Young, 152 Mo. 317, 53 S.W. 921. As 
plaintiff walked on a board sidewalk, a plank gave way 
causing him to fall. The soil underneath the plank had 
washed out, leaving a hollow underneath the plank. The 
plank itself was decayed, but would not have given way 
except for the hollow under it. In holding for the city, 
the court says : 
" It was really the hollow in the ground 
that permitted the plank to go down. There is no 
testimony tending to show actual notice to the city 
of the condition of the sidewalk, and no testimony 
tending to show how long it had remained in that 
condition. Besides, the testimony of plaintiff 
shows that the real cause of the yielding of the 
plank under the plaintiff's weight was the hollow 
beneath, caused by the ground being washed out. 
When that occurred is not shown. That tlie defect 
was not so obvious as to impute notice is shown 
by the plaintiff's testimony. The plaintiff, himself, 
had passed along the road frequently about the 
time,- not over the sidewalk,- but in the roaa, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
and had never observed such condition, and the 
five witnesses for defendant used the sidewalk 
daily several times, and did not observe it. The 
evidence fails to show any knowledge on the part 
of the city, or any circumstance from which notice 
could be implied, or that the city had neglected 
a reasonable opportunity to repair the defect. 
Under such evidence there could have been no 
verdict for the plaintiff." 
City of Omaha v. Kochen, 74 Neb. 718, 105 N.W. 182. 
The court says : 
"Where the defect is latent, not visible to ordi-
nary inspection, implied notice of the defect will 
not be presumed and will not be charged against 
the city until something occurs from which notice 
may be presumed or implied." 
Wakeham v. Township of St. Clair, 91 Mich. 15, 51 
N.W. 696. The township had constructed a break water 
along the edge of the river with an earth fill behind it. 
The road ran along within 13 feet of the breakwater. The 
river became high and near the bridge two large holes 
appeared in the road. Plaintiff while riding his horse 
turned it toward the break water to avoid a mud puddle 
in the road. There was a dispute whether the horse in 
so turning had stepped into one of the existing holes or 
broken through farther on where the water had under-
mined the road. The court says : 
"If, however, the accident occurred at the 
point five or six rods north of the bridge, and the 
injury was occasioned by the horse breakin~ 
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through what, upon the surface, appeared to be 
solid earth, defendant could not be chargeable 
with negligence. The court below assumed that the 
township was bound to know that this particular 
spot in the road way was weak, and that it should 
have repaired it, and laid down one rule whereby 
to test plaintiff's negligence, and another to meas-
ure the defendant's. If the road appeared safe to 
plaintiff, why not to defendant's officers~ This is 
not a structure like a bridge, where decay in-
evitably exhibits itself, and where opportunity 
is had to foresee and avoid that danger. Here were 
some 60 or 80 rods of this breakwater. Two holes 
appeared within 30 feet of this bridge, and one 
20 or 30 rods north of the bridge. Prior to this 
accident, but 3 or 4 feet of the entire line had 
give way. If the accident occurred at the point 
claimed by defendant, this very horse had prob-
ably traversed at a gallop some 3 rods of this line, 
and had not broken through. This defect was 
latent. The most that was known by the town-
ship authorities was that these breaks were liable 
to occur, but just where there was no means of 
discovering, except, perhaps, as was said by one 
witness, by digging down and finding out, and 
this very course would make them more liable to 
occur. There was nothing so suggestive of danger 
at that point as to make the township liable for the 
injury. Not only were the surface indications all 
right, but the horse broke through 13 or 1 + feet 
east of the traveled way. It is probable occur-
rences, rather than possible happenings, that 
municipalities are required to guard against. Cavi-
ties occur over waterpipes, gas-pipes, and sewer 
pipes in the traveled parts of the streets of our 
densely populous cities, hut a eave at one point 
does not indicate that the street will <'aYe for the 
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whole length of the conduit, and does not impose 
the duty of testing the entire length of the street. 
Defendant ·was entitled to an instruction that, if 
the accident occurred at the point five or six rods, 
north of the bridge, and the hole made by plain-
tiff's horse did not exist before the accident, but 
was n1ade at the time of the accident by plain-
tiff's horse, and there was nothing upon the sur-
face of the road at that point to give notice or 
knowledge that a hole was being eaten away under-
neath by the water, the plaintiff cannot recover.'-r 
Taylor ,~·. Town of Sterling, 250 ~lass. 123, 145 N.E. 
40. The driver of a wagon turned out into a gutter to 
pass another vehicle. The surface o.f the gutter gave way, 
letting the wheel down about 18 inches, throwing plaintiff 
to the ground. The three occupants of the wagon testified 
that the surface of the gutter looked allright; that the sur-
face looked perfectly safe; the same as it had looked when 
they passed over the street. After the accident it appear-
ed that the sub-surface had been washed out, and where 
the wheel went down there was a hole 3 feet long. The 
court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff saying: 
"Although one witness testified that the place 
where the wagon wheel went down looked as if it 
had been in that condition for some time, there was 
no evidence as to how long such condition had ex-
isted. It appears from the testimony of all the 
witnesses who were in the wagon at the time of the 
accident that there was nothing from the appear-
ance of the surface of the gutter where the wheel 
broke through to show that it had been gullied out 
underneath or that it was in any way defective, but 
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that so far as could be seen it was safe and in good 
condition, and there was no evidence to the con-
trary. 
"In these circumstances it is impossible to see 
how any reasonable inspection of the way by the 
town or its officers, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, could have discovered the hidden defec-
tive condition. If the officers of the town charged 
with the duty of keeping its ways in repair had in-
spected this road immediately preceding the acci-
dent, there was nothing so far as the evidence dis-
closes to ·give them any knowledge of the defect 
which resulted in the injuries received by the 
plaintiffs." 
Silva v. City of Somerville, 253 Mass. 545, 149 N.E. 
410. 
"PER CURIAM. The testimony of the plain-
tiff was in substance that while walking across a 
public street in the defendant city she stepped on 
a hollow about eighteen inches across and three or 
four inches lower than the street level. It did not 
drop down abruptly. It looked like it had rained 
and had sunk in. It was near a manhole raised 
about three or four inches above the street level. 
The earth gave way under her step making a hole 
about as big as a manhole. Other witnesses de-
scribed the resulting hole as being as big as a flour 
barrel, and three or four feet deep, and as being an 
irregular opening in the street and larger in cir-
cumference underneath than on the surface. One 
witness testified that about a week prior to the 
accident he 'had observed a sort of a round hole 
in the street as though the street had sunk in five 
or six inches; that it was a graduated hole. ShortlY 
after he first noticed it he noticed there was ~ 
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cover over it- his impression being that it was 
some sort of a stick, something as though to give 
warning that there was a hole; and that he noticed 
that a day or two before the accident.' 
.. It is manifest, that the cause of the injury 
to the plaintiff was the giving way of the earth 
when the plaintiff stepped on it and the very con-
siderable caYity underneath the surface of the 
street. There is nothing in the evidence fairly to 
indicate any warning to the defendant of this de-
fective condition, or any breach of obligation on 
the part of the defendant in not discovering it. 
The liability of the defendant is not established. 
The case is governed on this point by Taylor v. 
Sterling, 250 Mass. 123, 145 N.E. 40, and the cases 
there reviewed. 
"There was no evidence to warrant a finding 
of neglect of duty by the defendant. 
"Verdict ordered to be entered for defendant 
to stand." 
Bello v. City of Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E. 
526. An adjoining property owner maintained a steam 
pipe running under the sidewalk to the gutter. Plaintiff 
stepped off the sidewalk on to the area between the prop-
erty and the sidewalk. It looked natural, but when he. 
stepped on it, it gave way letting him sink into boiling 
water and steam. A directed verdict for the city was af-
firmed. The court said: 
"but the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses 
very clearly establishes the fact that there were no 
surface indications of a nuisance at that point, and 
that when plaintiff stepped off the sidewalk the 
surface, which appeared to be safe and free from 
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even the appearance of danger, suddenly gave 
way, thereby permitting his leg to sink into the 
boiling substance, and causing the iri.jury and dam-
age. Inasmuch as there was no open defect, in the 
nature of things the city's agents could not have 
notice or knowledge of such non-existent situation. 
"Notice, either actual or imputed, is just as 
necessary to be proven as the existence of the nui-
sance itself. This must necessarily mean notice 
or knowledge of the actual present existence of a 
condition, and not notice or knowledge of some 
probable or possible acts of some third person 
from which it may be inferred that, if those acts 
are in future committed, a nuisance may be 
caused." 
Smith v. Krebs, 166 Kan. 586, 203 P. 2d 215. Krebs 
maintained an area way in the sidewalk covered by 2 x 2 
planks resting on 2 x 4 cross pieces. When plaintiff 
stepped on one of the planks it gave way letting her foot 
and leg into the hole. Examination after the accident 
disclosed the board was rotted on the under side, A de-
murrer to plaintiff's evidence was sustained. The court 
says: 
"The general rule is that when a street or side-
walk is once constructed so that it is reasonably 
safe for use of travelers or pedestrians and later 
becomes defective the city cannot be said to be 
negligent so as to be liable in tort resulting from 
the use of such defective street until the eitY has 
knowledge or notice of such defect and has ~ rea-
sonable opportunity to repair it. 
"In this case it is conceded the <'itY did not 
have knowledge of the defect, and th~rP is no 
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daim that it was patent. The board plaintiff 
stepped on looked as sound as any of the others. 
There was nothing in the appearance of the cover-
ing over the hole in the sidewalk which would cause 
anyone looking at it to think it was otherwise than 
sound. 
"Therefore, under the authority of the cases 
above cited, it is clear that no negligence of the 
city was shown." 
Sherman v. City of Pittsburgh, 155 Pa. Super 560, 
39 A. 2d 156. Plaintiff was injured when a portion of the 
sidewalk gave way under him in front of the old post of-
fice. The court says : 
"In the present case the injuries suffered by 
plaintiff were the result of a defective condition 
in the sidewalk, but the liability of the city arises 
only if it had notice, actual or constructive, of the 
existence of such condition at the place where the 
accident occurred. Good et al v. Philadelphia et al, 
355 Pa. 13, 16, 6 A. 2d 101. To have charged the 
city with constructive notice, it must have appear-
ed that the dangerous condition was apparent up-
on reasonable inspection. 
"We are of the opinion that the record in this 
case fails to disclose any negligence upon the part 
of the city, or any notice, actual or constructive, 
to the city of any danger in the condition of the 
sidewalk at the place where plaintiff sustained his 
accident. 
"The defect in the sidewalk was latent and not 
observable. Neither the plaintiff nor his witnesses 
testified that there was anything about the side-
walk to indicate that it was in a dangerous condi-
tion. Plaintiff testified that he used the sidewalk 
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where the accident happened, almost every day. 
It appears, as told by himself, that, at the time, 'I 
was looking where I was walking.' He said there 
was 'nothing unusual with the sidewalk. "\Yell, 
I would say there was a few cracks in the side-
walk; that is about all.'" 
Dow v. Town of D'Lo, 152 So. 475 Miss. 
"The fact that mere passers-by did not ob-
serve or discover a dangerous defect is not suffi-
cient to relieve a municipality of constructive 
notice ; but if the defect or danger be such as not 
to be observable by those who constantly pass day 
by day or who for years have lived and labored at 
the location in question, constructive notice cannot 
be charged upon the municipality unless the dan-
ger was the result of faulty work by the muni-
cipality itself. As to danger of this nature, the· 
town cannot be charged with the neglect of ordi-
nary care to discover what other persons con-
stantly thereabout, including the nearest neigh-
bors, had not discovered in all these years." 
POINT NO. IV. THE VERDICT, THOUGH AWARDING 
I)AMAGES AS SPECIAL DAMAGES, SHOULD BE CON-
STRUED AS A GENERAL VERDICT IN THE SUM OF $1000 
AND IS NO GROUNDS FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The form of verdict submitted to the jury, in the 
event they found for the plaintiff was in form calling for 
stating separately the amount of general damage and 
the amount of special damage. Opposite the words "gen-
eral damage$--------", the jury wrote the words "no." After 
the words "special damages" they placed the figure $1000 
after the dollar sign. 
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Having granted defendant's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict the trial court's overruling 
the motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict 
was improperly rendered would follow as a matter of 
course. 'y e have been unable to find any authority di-
rectly in point. However, Oregon and Minnesota courts 
have passed on the validity of a verdict reading as fol-
lows: 
"We find for plaintiff and assess damage in 
the sum of $--------, no damage," 
and came to opposite conclusions. 
In Royal Indemnity Co. v. Island Lake Township, 177 
Minn. 408, 225 N.W. 291, the court held that such aver-
dict was valid and was in reality a verdict for defendant. 
In Kline v. Miller, ______ Or.------, 77 P. 2d 1103, 116 A.L.R. 
820, the Oregon Court held the verdict not sufficient to 
support a judgment for defendant and sustained an order 
for a new triaL A strong dissenting opinion follows the 
Minnesota ruling and relied upon the following statement 
from Lew v. Lucas, 37 Or. 208,61 P. 344: 
"A verdict should be construed liberally ... 
If the meaning of the jury can be ascertained and 
the point in issue can be concluded from its ver-
dict, the court will, however informally it may be 
expressed, mold it into form, and make it serve·." 
In Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 9 P. 2d 505, 81 
A.L.R. 908, the plaintiff sue.d for actual and punitive dam-
ages in an action for libel and slander. The words charged 
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were actionable per se. The jury found for plaintiff and 
assessed no amount for actual damages and $5,000 as 
punitive damages. The court held the verdict valid say-
ing: 
"The fact that the jury inadvertently or by 
some mischance assessed the entire damages as 
exemplary instead of segregating them consti-
tutes an error of form rather than of sustenance." 
While on the surface there appears to be an incon-
sistency in the jury's verdict, we think the intention ap-
pears to find generally for the plaintiff in a total sum of 
$1,000. The jury, apparently, decided plaintiff was en-
titled to recover and instead of trying to make a separate 
finding of general and special damages they simply 
awarded the sum of $1,000 as being the total amount to 
which plaintiff was entitled. We submit, therefore, that 
there was no error in overruling plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial 
CONCLUSION 
The order granting defendant's motion to dismiss 
should be sustained. First, there was no proof of negli-
gence on the part of defendant. There was absolutely 
no proof whatever that at the time the areidrnt hap-
pened, there was any actionable defect in the sidewalk 
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at the place of the accident of which the city would have, 
or could have had, notice. That the city is not liable for 
a latent defect is conceded by plaintiff. The evidence 
offered by plaintiff of the condition of the sidewalk after 
the accident wholly failed to establish the existence of an 
actionable defect at the time of the accident. Further-
more, it \vas incompetent, as no proper foundation had 
been laid. 
Second, whatever unevenness existed between the 
city sidewalk and the entrance walk into the apartment 
building, assuming some unevenness existed at the time 
of the accident (as to which, however, we assert there is 
no proof) there is no proof whatever that such uneven-
ness was the proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff 
did not stumble, slip, turn his ankle, or in any wise en-
counter such difference in elevation. 
Third. The failure to eliminate the separation of 
the city walk from the adjoining walk, called a crack by 
plaintiff, and the other cracks did not in any wise con-
tribute as a proximate cause of the accident. Further-
more, the existence of such cracks by themselves did not 
constitute any actionable defect in the sidewalk. There 
is no evidence, or even any assertion by plaintiff, that 
these cracks gave any notice of existence of the cavity. 
The simple fact is that in some unexplained manner, 
without any notice whatever to the city, the supporting 
earth had been removed under the sidewalk and the 
concrete gave way under plaintiff's weight. The defect 
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thus existing was latent, not discoverable upon reason-
able inspection. Therefore, the city is not liable for the 
unfortunate accident, and dismissal should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLM:GREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assistant City Attorneys 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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